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UNITED STATES 
v. 
LOUISIANA, et al. 
~ l{tJJI)r atUJ;uJ {J)~~qj;l4l 
/;al cAf~ MfUlJe. f »?as fer 
~/,tcke/e 
Petition for Allowance of 
Additional Compensation 
and Reimbursement of 
Expenses to the Special 
Master 
[Special Master: 
Walter P. Armstrong] 
SUNMARY: The Special Master requests a final allowance of 
fees for his four years of service, bringing his total award to 
$100,000. 
FACTS: Petr was appointed the Special Naster in this 
litigation 15 years ago in 1969. The present, arid possibly the 
last, phase of the case commenced in 1980 when motions by 
Mississippi and Alabama and cross-motions by the United States 
were referred to petr as the Special Master. In November 1982 
the Court approved an interim award of $50,000 for petr's 
services from February 1980 through July 31, 1982. 
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Since then the Special Naster received 10 post-trial 
documents, heard post-trial argument and received four 
additional briefs. On Feb. 10, 1984 the Special Master 
forwarded to counsel his proposed final report. Written 
comments were filed and a conference was held to consider the 
comments. On Apr. 9, 1984 the Final Report (56 pages) was 
delivered to the Clerk. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr requests a total fee of $100,000, 
$50,000 over his interim award. Half the award will be 
initially paid by the United States. Alabama and Mississippi 
will initially pay one quarter of the award each. The states 
and the United States have approved and consented to the 
application. The Special Master also requests that the final ---allocation of all payments to the Special Master "award the 
conclusion of these proceedings, at which time any necessary 
adjustment can be made." Finally, the Special Master requests 
that he "be relieved of any further duties and obligations under 
the references of February 19 and March 17, 1980, pending 
further orders of the Court." 
Petr notes that before filing his report he heard 11 days 
of trial at which more than 350 exhibits were filed. Before 
trial he had received some 74 documents including 11 depositions 
which totaled 1,291 pages. The 11docket 11 for the four years that 
the litigation has been before the Special Master reflects the 
filing of some 94 documents. 
DISCUSSION: A review of the Special Master's 56-page 
report reveals the complexity of this litigation. The Special 
Master dealt with such concepts as straight baselines, juridical 
- ~ -
bays, historic bays and historic territorial waters both 
preceding and after the United States's adoption of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (the 
Geneva Convention). Not only did the parties disagree on the 
facts and the United States' historic position but the United 
States also argued that it was entitled to change its position. 
Although the Special Master has not provided the Court with 
a specific breakdown of the hours he spent on the case, the 
parties have all approved the applicatiori and both the length of 
time that the litigation consumed and its complexity suggest 
that the requested allowance is reasonable. If the Court has 
any questions as to the amount requested, the Special Master 
might be given the opportunity to supplement his application. 
The Special Master's specific breakdown of the payment of 
the allowance and expenses properly follows the interim division 
agreed to by the parties. The breakdown also credits 
Mississippi with the additional payment of $12,500 that the 
Court authorized Mississippi to advance (Oct. 31, 1983 order). 
The Special Master notes that the final allocation among the 
parties should await the conclusion of the proceeding. 
Finally, the Special Master requests to be relieved of any 
further duties and obligations pending further orders by the 
court. The Court may want to defer relieving the Special Master 
until it enters a final decree. The Special Master has no 
further duty pending the Court's review of his report. However, 
if the Court relieved the Special Master now, it would have to 
reappoint him if it wanted to remand all or part of the report 
to the Special Master. Since he has no obligations pending the 
- q -
Court's decision on his report, there is no harm in deferring 
his release. 
CONCLUSION: The complexity and longevity of this action, 
as well as the parties' consent, support the Special Master's 
request for additional compensation. The Court, however, should 
defer the Master's request to be relieved until the Court 
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UNITED STATES 
v. 
LOUISIANA, et al. 
~CI/ £f)()L c. E){C £PTIONS 
~~~ Of!AL fJIU-OmEAJ T 
Exceptions of the United 
States to the Report of 
the Special Master 
Exceptions of Alabama to 
the Report of the Special 
Master 
Exceptions of Mississippi 
to the Report of the 
S ecial Master 
SUMMARY: The Special Master Sound 
\. ~ 
is both a1~uridical and a historic bay and therefore its waters ---0 ~ 
are inland waters and all submerged lands belong exclusively to - --- -----
the States. The United States has filed exceptions contesting 
~
the Master's conclusion. The United States claims that the 
portions of Mississippi Sound more than three miles from the 
1- ar flJ 
~~cAJJb-._ ~ i fL 
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() s v. M~'vu L /L-4-J~ ~In ~ 
bu._ 
mainland or an island belong to the United States. Alabama and 
Mississippi have filed exceptions advancing additional grounds 
of support for the Master's conclusions. 
The Court may wish to schedule oral argument on the 
exceptions because they raise a number of questions concerning 
the determination of boundaries which have national and 
international ramifications. Argument might be scheduled in 
tandem with argument in No. 35 Original, United States v. Maine, 
as both cases raise the issue of whether an be 
considered an extension of the mainland. 
BACKGROUND: ~9~60 in renewed proceedings following 
passage of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §1301 
et ~.,the Court held that the grant of territorial submerged 
land to Alabama and Mississippi extende~ ~ore than three ~ 
nautical miles into tbe Gulf of Mexico from their respective 





(1960). The Court did not, however, locate the coastline from~f.~ 
which the three-mile belt is to be measured. Ht£-~f~ 
In due course, it became clear that the parties disagreed 
on the treatment of Mississippi Sound, the water area 
immediately south of the mainland shore of Hississippi and 
Alabama, and north of certain
1
I ringe island; (see exhibit 1). 
The two states claim the whole of the Mississippi Sound as 5 ~ 
/L~ 
inland waters, so that their coastline s begin at the islands. ~
The United States rejects the inland status of Mississippi Sound 
and, accordingly claims as areas of exclusive federal interest 
those portions of the Sound that are more than three miles from 
either the mainland or any island. Such pockets exist because -----
some of the barrier islands are more than six miles from the 
mainland. 
To resolve this conflict the parties filed motions and 
cross-motions for supplemental decrees. The Court referred all 
the pleadings to the already appointed Special Master. 444 U.S. 
1064 (1980) and 445 U.S. 923 (1980). A further motion for 
relief by Mississippi was referred to the Special Master in 
1982. 457 U.S. 1115 (1982). After extended proceedings, the 
Special Master submitted his Report on April 9, 1984, 
recommending a decree in favor of the states. The Court ordered 
~--------------~7 
the Report filed and called for exceptions. 
The United States filed exceptions to the Master's Report. 
Both Alabama and Mississippi also filed exceptions urging 
additional grounds of support for the Master's conclusions. 
Alaska has filed an amicus brief addressing issues that are of 
particular concern to it in its boundary litigation (United 
States v. Alaska, No. · 84 Original, presently pending before a 
Special Master). 
SPECIAL ~~STER'S REPORT: The Master starts his Report by 
explaining the legal context for the dispute. In United States 
v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965) this Court adopted the u/e 
provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the ~~ 
1~ 
~
Contiguous Zone (the Geneva Convention) as the basis for 
~
determining the seaward boundaries of various states. 
~es 3 and lij,£ the ~ion the seaward 
boundaries of the mainland a~ islands extend from the 
Under 
low water 
lines along the coasts. This creates ~nc :aves of ntgn seas] when 
the islands are more than six miles from the mainland. 
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention avoids this problem by 
r( " 
allowing a country to draw its boundary along a fringe of 
islands, thus enclosing the water between the islands and the 
mainland. This Court, however, has suggested that the use of 
straight baselines is an optional method of establishing 
boundaries and "should be left to the branches of Government 
responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy." United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 72-73 -(1969). Here the United States has declined to adopt the 
~
f ~traight baseline method.\\ The states nonetheless argue that the 
United States has by its action (although not explicitly) 
adopted the straight baseline method. A similar argument was 
made by Louisiana in a prior proceeding before the same Master. 
The Master rejected the argument and the Court overruled 
Louisiana's exceptions. 420 U.S. 529 (1975). 
Since the Un{~ed States does not utilize the straight J3ur ~ 
for ~~ baseline method, the Master turns to two other 
treating the Mississippi Sound as inland wat t;'/ /2..-J~ U 
~ ~  
A. Juridical Bays. Under the Geneva Convention, the ~~~ 
w~ within a ~cal baYJ are considered inland waters. The~~ 
Master notes that there are four requirements for a juridical 
It must be a well marked indentation; (2) its 
must be in such proportion to the width of its mouth 
to contain landlocked waters and to constitute more than a 
mere curvature of the coast; (3) it must have a closing line of 
twenty-four miles or less; and (4) it must meet the semi-circle 
test."1 
~-~~f-
lThis last test is set forth in Article 7 of the Geneva 
Convention as "[A]n~ indentation shall not, however, be regarded 
as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of 
~· the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth 




Before the criteria can be applied to Mississippi Sound, 
the boundaries of the Sound must be determined. This involves 
the characterization of two islands; the ~sle Au~to the 
west and fu;~ to the east. (see exhibit 1) Article 7 
of the Geneva Convention does not encompass bays formed in part 
by islands which cannot realistically be considered part of the 
mainland. When faced with the question of whether an island 
could be treated as part of the mainland, the Court in United 
States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 66 (1969) stated: 
While there is little objective guidance on this 
question to be found in international law, the question 1. ~ 
wh~er a p~ and is to be trea_ted a&Jir L of YO , 
t d would__dgp..end on s~ factors as i ize, ~~.::A--6 its distance from the mai~dy.-the depth and utility ~ ~~~1.-~ () "' of the .intervening waters~e shape of the island or ~~, -~~ 
curvature of the coast. .  
The Court also suggested that the Master might consider "any 4 ~ 
other criteria and any evidence he finds it helpful to consider" 
to determine whether an island is integrally related to the 
mainland. 
The western end of the Sound is not in issue as the United 
States admits "that the Isle au Pitre might be treated as an 
extension of the Louisiana mainland pursuant to the 1969 
Louisiana decision [394 U.S. 11]." 
The treatment of Dauphin Island is critical because if 
Dauphin Island is not considered as part of the mainland, there 
may be no eastern headland to enclose the Sound as a bay. 
Dauphin Island is separated from the mainland at Cedar Point by 
1.6 nautical miles. The depth of the water in the straits is no 
~ 
greater than six feet except for the dredged channel. The 
island is joined to the mainland by a bridge and is inhabited. 
v -
The Master bases his conclusion that Dauphin Island is part 
of the mainland on the fact that the island is in the mouth of 
Mobile Bay, which is a juridical bay. The Master reasons: - There seems to be no doubt that under the Geneva 
Convention internal waters are to be subsumed under 
the general category of mainland. If this is correct, 
then Dauphin Island, as llt ad joins the mainland, is 
clearl an extension thereof; in effect, a _Eeninsula 
extending westwardly r from ana separating--the 
Gulf of Mexico from Mississippi Sound. 
Report at page 14. 
Once Dauphin Island is treated as part of the mainland, the ---------~~ ~ 
Master has no trouble finding that the Sound meets the other 
criteria for a juridical bay. The total water distances between 
the Isle au Pitre and Dauphin Island, along a line formed by the 
barrier islands, totals 21.7641 miles, less than 24 miles. The 
Master finds that the Sound is a well-marked indentation with 
six natural entrance points between the islands that form the 
mouth of the juridical bay. Re states "[T]he relation of 
maximum penetration to width of mouth is therefore .4167:1, 
which in my opinion is enough to constitute more than a mere 
curvature of the coast." Report at page 20. 
The final consideration is whether the waters of the 
Mississippi Sound are so enclosed as to be considered 
landlocked. The Master notes that the straight line distance 
from Isle au Pitre to Dauphin Island is approximately 45 miles. 
The water gap distance is 21.7641 miles and none of the gaps 
between the islands is more than six miles in width. The Master 
concludes that the waters in the Sound are landlocked and that 
the Mississippi Sound i~
B. Historic Bays. The Special Master next addresses 
the states' argument that the Sound is a historic bay. The 
' .. 
Geneva Convention provides that its definitions shall not apply 
to limit a state's claim to historic inland waters. In United 
States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975) the Court summarized the 
criteria for a ~
The term "historic bay" is not defined in the Con-
vention. The Court, however, has stated that in order 
to establish that a body of water is a historic bay, a 
coastal 7b ation ')must have "traditionally asserted and 
maint ainea domi nion with the~ acquiescence of foreign 
nations~UnTtea' States v. California, 381 U.S. at 
172 .... Furthermore, the Court appears to have 
accepted the general view that at least three factors - ~ 
are significant in the determination of historic bay ~  
status: (1) the claiming nation must have exercised ~-~~~. ~ 
authority over the area~ (Zy-that exercise must have ~~~ 
been continuous; and (3J £oreign states must have ~ 
acquiesced in the exercise of authority. Louisiana At~~~ 
Boundary Case, 394 at 75, . . . (~-------\ 
(422 U.S. at 189). t-L_:>;:; ~ 
The states claim that Nississippi Sound has been clai~
the nations that possessed the surrounding mainland and islands K~,, 
since at least 1756. · The United States, however, denies that ~ ..------, ~5, 
the Sound is a historic bay. In United States v. California,  
381 U. S. 139 (1965) the Court held that the federal 
~ J-4,q 
government's disclaimer was entitled to considerable deference. ~~~ 
The Master and the states, however, note that in the Louisiana ~ 
Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 77, n. 104 the Court stated: 
It is one thing to say that the United States 
should not be required to take the novel, affirmative 
step of adding to its territory by drawing straight 
baselines. It would be quite another to allow tne 
United States to prevent recognition of a historic 
title which may already have ripened because of 
past events but which is called into question for 
the first time in a domestic lawsuit. The latter, 
we believe would approach an im~ermissible con-
traction of territory against wh~ch we cautioned 
in United States v. California. 
The Master found that "during the period from 1756 to 1819 
what is now Mississippi Sound was apparently considered by 
whatever nation possessed the surrounding mainland and islands 
as part of its possession." Report at page 28. The Master 
finds that the United States treated the Mississippi Sound as 
inland water until 1971. He notes that the Sound is relatively 
shallow and that its navigational utility as an intracoastal 
passageway was recogn'ized as early as 1817. In 1822 the Sound 
was described in Congress as a "little interior sea" and in 1840 
plans were proposed for its military defense. Plans for the 
fortification of Ship Island, one of the fringe islands, were 
proposed as early as 1847, authorized in 1857 and construction 
was underway when the Civil War broke out. The fort had a minor 
role in the Civil War and was eventually abandoned in 1875. 
Furthermore, in various papers filed with this Court2 and 
Congress) the United States has characterized the Sound as 
waters. The Master also concluded that treating the Sound as 
inland water was consistent with the United States' well-known 
international position on boundaries. 
The Master notes that this Court's prior decisions are not 
dispositive. In Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906), an 
action between states in which the United States was not a 
party, the Court appeared to suggest that the Mississippi Sound 
was inland water. However, in United States v. Louisiana, 363 
U.S. 1 (1960)
1 
the Court held that the states'acts of admission 
did not necessarily convey title to all of the Sound. 
2In its 1958 Brief in Sup~ort of Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Amended Colliplaint Ln an earlier phase of this case, 
the United States construed Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 
(1906) as describing Mississippi Sound as inland water which 
therefore passed to the States on their entry into the Union. 
'. 
The Master found that the United States' first public 
disclaimer concerning Mississippi Sound was made in April 1971 
by a publication of a set of maps delineating a three-mile 
territorial limit within the Sound. He opined that: 
They undoubtedly undertake to rescind the con-
cession made by the United States in its brief in an 
earlier stage of this proceeding. However under the 
circumstances it is difficult to accept the dis-
claimer as entirely extrajudicial in its motivation. 
It would appear to be more in the nature of an 
attempt by the United States to prevent recognition 
of any preexisting historic title which might 
already have ripened because of past events but 
which was called into question for the first time 
in a domestic lawsuit. 
Report at page 47. 
The Master concludes that Nississippi Sound ~ a historic 
bay because (1) the United States exercised authority over the -..,.,._ ' 
Sound by the positions it took in international affairs, before 
the Court and before Congress and by fortifying Ship Island and 
patrolling the Sound, (2) the exercise was continuous from the 
Louisiana Purchase in 1803 to 1971, and (3) foreign states 
acquiesced in the exercise of authority as they knew or should 
have known of the exercise and did not protest. 
THE UNITED STATES' EXCEPTIONS: The SG presents three major 
arguments against the Master's conclusions. They are: (1) 
Dauphin Island is not an extension of the mainland and does not 
form a juridical bay; (2) even if Dauphin Island is properly 
treated as an extension of the mainland, the whole Mississippi 
Sound does not qualify as a juridical bay; and (3) the Sound is 
not properly deemed an historic bay. The SG suggests that the 
Court need not give the Master's Report much deference because 
the Master's errors are errors of law not fact. The exceptions 
- 10 -
do not argue disputed facts or the weight to be given evidence, 
but the legal reasoning and conclusions drawn from the evidence. 
The SG's first point is that even though Mobile Bay is a 
juridical bay and thus inland water, it is still water and not 
land. Thus, the fact that Dauphin Island is on Mobile Bay does 
not allow the island to be considered an extension of the 
mainland. The argument that inland water should be treated as 
part of the mainland was made by Louisiana ten years ago in an 
earlier phase of this case. The same Special Master rejected 
the argument in his Report and the Court rejected Louisiana's 
exceptions. 420 U.S. 529 (1975). The principle of equity of 
treatment suggests that Alabama and Mississippi should not be 
more generously treated than Louisiana. Precedent aside, the 
Master's approach is wrong because although a nation's 
sovereignty extends to both the mainland and inland waters, the 
Convention distinguishes between the two. Thus, Article 7(3) of 
the Convention--in applying the semi-circle and the 24-mile 
rule--measures only the water gaps not the islands. The 
Master's approach allows for an unacceptable extension of 
sovereignty because distant islands could relate back through 
other islands to the waters of a bay and to the mainland. The 
SG suggests that "the Special Master's assimilation of inland 
waters to land would, if accepted here, invite substantial 
mischief in other cases." 
The SG also argues that Dauphin Island, quite apart from 
its relationship to Mobile Bay, may not be considered an 
extension of the mainland. The SG emphasizes the 1.6 mile wide 
strait that separates Dauphin Island from the mainland and the 
shape of the island. The SG refers the Court to his arguments 
against treating Long Island as an extension of the mainland in 
No. 35 Original, United States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New 
York), which is pending before the Court. 
If Dauphin Island is an extension of the mainland, the 
juridical bay thus created extends to the nearest headland on 
the mainland (Point aux Cheres) and does not include the entire 
Sound. (see exhibit 1) The SG argues that the Court has 
determined that "Article 7 does not encompass bays formed in 
part by islands which cannot realistically be considered part of 
the mainland.'' Lousiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 67 (footnote 
omitted). The parties generally agree that the barrier island 
cannot be deemed extensions of the mainland and the distance 
from Isle au Pitre to Dauphin Island, excluding the islands, 
exceeds 24 miles. 
The SG admits that there is some evidence of treatment of 
Mississippi Sound as inland water. He argues, however, that the 
Haster failed to give sufficient deference to the federal 
government's disclaimer and failed to recognize that the 
disclaimer required the States to present clear evidence that 
historic title had already ripened because of past events. The 
SG notes that no state has met this burden of proof, although 
California, Louisiana, Florida and Alaska have tried, and "there 
is no warrant for singling out Mississippi Sound as a uniquely 
stronger case." 
The SG discounts the history of Mississippi Sound prior to 
the admissions of Mississippi and Alabama to the Union. He 
notes that the prior sovereigns did not differentiate inland 
from territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, upon their 
admission to the Union, the states relinquished their colonial 
claims, except as the United States chose to confirm them. 
The SG finds the treatment of the Sound last century 
inconclusive. He notes that initial plans to fortify the Sound 
were rejected on the ground that the Sound was too open to the 
sea to be defensible. Efforts were made to fortify Ship Island 
but the fortification was never completed. Furthermore, the 
abandonment of the fort should be as significant as its 
construction. The SG also suggests that the military fort was 
not designed "to impede peaceful vessels engaged in innocent 
passage" and was not inconsistent with treating the Sound as 
territorial waters rather than inland waters. 
The SG suggests that this Court's opinion in Louisiana v. 
Maryland, 202 U.S. 1, although it might be so read, does not 
hold that the Sound is inland water. He notes that United 
States was not a party to the litigation and should not be 
barred by it. The United States in 1958 did state in a brief to 
this Court that Louisiana v. Mississippi, supra, described the 
Sound as inland water. However, in litigation involving 
Louisiana, the United States initially conceded certain areas to 
Louisiana and then changed its position. This Court held that 
the United States was not bound by its initial position. 
Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 73-74 n. 97. Here, the 
United States has never made an express concession. 
The SG finds the remaining materials mentioned by the 
Master to be less than compelling. Some items such as the 1951 
letter from the Acting Secretary of State have already been 
rejected as inconclusive. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 
139, 163-165 (1965). The most that can be said is that foreign 
countries may have had the impression that the United States 
favored a general formula for boundaries that would treat the 
Sound as inland water. The impression of a general policy is 
not a specific claim and is far short of the type of "effective, 
persistent and notorious exercise of inland jurisdiction" that 
the states must demonstrate to overcome the United States' 
present disclaimer. 
MISSISSIPPI'S EXCEPTIONS: Mississippi advances three 
arguments as alternate bases for the conclusion that Mississippi 
Sound is inland water. The arguments are: (1) judicial 
deference to the United States' disclaimer of Article 4 straight 
baselines is inappropriate in this case; (2) Mississippi Sound 
qualifies as inland waters regardless of the treatment of 
Dauphin Island as an extension of the mainland; and (3) 
Mississippi's Act of Admission confirms the state's title to 
Mississippi Sound. 
Mississippi's first argument is premised on the Master's 
finding that in ratifying the Geneva Convention, the United 
States departed from its previously held position. Prior to 
ratification, the United States subscribed to the "ten-mile 
rule" which provided that "waters enclosed between the mainland 
and off-lying islands which were so closely grouped that no 
entrance exceeded 10 nautical miles in width were deemed inland 
waters." Mississippi notes that in United States v. Louisiana, 
394 U.S. 11 (1969) when the Court deferred to the federal 
government's right to opt for straight baselines, the Court 
talked about requiring the United States to take a "novel, 
affirmative step of adding to its territory." 394 U.S. at 77. 
- 14 
Here the use of straight baselines is not novel and does not 
enlarge the traditional international boundaries of the United 
States. The United States conceded Mississippi Sound to be 
inland water over a quarter century ago and the waters have 
become part of Mississippi's territory, protected by Article IV, 
Section 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution. 
Mississippi's second argument is that a careful analysis of 
the Convention and the considerations behind its final language 
leads to the conclusion that an arm of a bay may be composed of 
a broken line of islands. Mississippi concludes that the fringe 
islands are such an arm and therefore the Sound is a juridical 
bay even if Dauphin Island may not be considered an extension of 
the mainland. 
Finally, Mississippi argues that its Act of Admission 
established Mississippi's boundary on the seaward side of the 
barrier islands. Mississippi recognized that in United States 
v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 67-68, 81 (1960) this Court held that 
the language of Louisiana's and Mississippi's acts of admission 
"evidently contemplated no territorial sea whatever." 
Mississippi distinguishes the case on the grounds that (a) the 
states were attempting to extend their territories beyond the 
three miles approved by the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1301 
et. seq., and (b) all the islands on the coast of Louisiana were 
within six miles of the mainland. Mississippi notes that in the 
Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), when the Court 
allowed the United States to withdraw its concessions to 
Louisiana, the Court noted that Louisiana had not relied to its 
detriment on the concessions. 394 U.S. 73 n. 97. Should the 
Court reject all the other grounds for finding Mississippi Sound 
to be inland water, Mississippi requests a remand to the Master 
to allow it to present evidence of detrimental reliance in the 
United States' previous position. 
ALABAMA'S EXCEPTIONS: Alabama presents two exceptions to 
the Master's Report: (1) Alabama's Act of Admission, as 
historically interpreted, establishes Alabama's historic land 
boundary along the seaward side of Dauphin Island; and (2) if 
Dauphin Island is an extension of the Alabama mainland but the 
whole Mississippi Sound is not a juridical bay, the Court should 
rule that there is a smaller jurisdictional bay with a mouth 
located between the western end of Dauphin Island and Point Aux 
Chenes on the mainland. 
Alabama recognizes that pursuant to this Court's opinion in 
United States v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 1 (1960) its Act of 
Admission on its face does not cover the Mississippi Sound. 
Alabama contends, however, that the Act, as historically 
interpreted, extends Alabama's coastline to the seaward shore of 
Dauphin Island. Alabama notes that in Pollard's Lessee v. 
Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845) this Court held that a state upon 
admission to the Union owned the land beneath navigable inland 
waters within their boundaries. Furthermore, the rights 
acquired upon admission vested on admission and are permanent. 
See Oregon v. Corvallis, 429 U.S. 363 (1977). Consequently, if 
Alabama establishes an Act of Admission boundary on the seaward 
side of Dauphin Island, the rights acquired on admission may not 
be taken away. Alabama argues that preadmission descriptions of 
the area as well as post-admission interpretations all construed 
Alabama's boundary to extend to Dauphin Island. Alabama notes 
) ~ that in Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906) this Court 
described Mississippi Sound as inland water and lists some 18 
incidents between 1940 and 1979 in which the federal government 
represented Mississippi Sound as inland water. 
Alabama has always maintained that its jurisdiction covers 
the Sound and Dauphin Island. Since at least 1929 Alabama has 
enforced its criminal laws in the waters between the mainland 
and Dauphin Island and around Dauphin Island. See Basarge v. 
State, 121 So. 427 (Ala. Cr. App. 1929) cert. denied, 121 So.2d 
428 (Ala. 1929). Since 1930 Alabama has entered into over 50 
oil and gas leases in Mississippi Sound, many of which concern 
the areas here in dispute. 
Alabama's second position is the same as the United States' 
fall-back position. If Dauphin Island is an extension of 
Alabama mainland, but the entire Mississippi Sound is not a 
juridical bay, then the waters between Dauphin Island and the 
mainland form a small juridical bay. 
ALASKA'S POSITION AS AMICUS: Alaska submitted a brief as 
amicus curiae in opposition to the United States' exceRtions 
because Alaska is litigating its boundaries with the United 
States [United States v. Alaska, No. 84 Original]. Alaska's 
brief contains five arguments: 
. ,. 
(1) when Alaska became a state, the official 
position of the Unites States was to 
(2) 
assimilate "objectionable pockets" of 
high sea to the territorial sea and 
Alaska's Statehood Act defines its 
territory to include territorial waters; 
the Special Master's discussion of 
straight baselines is unnecessary and 
inadeguate and the Court should not make 
a dec~sion on straight baselines until 
the issue is fully developed in Alaska's 
"AQA• 
(3) both the language of the Submerged Lands 
Act and the intent behind the Act give 
the states all submerged lands between 
their most seaward contiguous boundary and 
the mainland, even if some of the submerged 
lands are more than three mil~s from the 
mainland or the barrier islands; 
(4) the Submerged Lands Act was an extension 
of the equal footing doctrine to offshore 
submerged lands and therefore Mississippi 
and Alabama cannot be treated in a different 
manner than Louisiana; and 
(5) the executive may not, without the approval of 
Congress, renounce a state's claim to lands 
within the state's boundaries. 
DISCUSSION: The increased value of submerged lands with 
their oil and mineral deposits has resulted in the United States 
taking the anomo~ position of arguing that there are pockets 
of "high sea" within Missi'ssippi Sound that belong to the United 
States even though they are surrounded by territorial waters 
belonging to the states. Because the Court has adopted the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention as the proper basis upon 
which to determine the coastal boundaries of the various states, 
the Court's analysis of the Master's Report and the exceptions 
will not only influence pending suits by other states (i.e., 
Alaska, New York, Massachusetts) but may affect United State's 
foreign policy. 
The only clear conclusion that can be drawn from the Report 
and exceptions is that the exceptions merit oral argument. The 
issues raised are important and n·either the ?-1aster' s findings 
nor the parties exceptions are so clearly correct as to merit 
summary adoption. 
The Master's conclusion that Dauphin Island may be treated 
as an extension of the mainland may be questioned on two 
grounds. His decision that Nobile Bay, a juridical bay, may be 
treated as land for determining Dauphin Island's relationship to 
the mainland is unique. The finding appears to be contrary to 
the Master's previous rejection of the argument. Furthermore, 
if the Master's position were adopted, some restriction might be 
necessary to limit the process of bays abutting islands which 
create new bays which abut additional islands. 
The question of when an island may be treated as an 
extension of the mainland is presently before the Court in 
No. 35 Original, United States v. Maine. Whatever decision the 
Court makes in that case may affect this case because: (a) the 
Court's discussion of assimilation of islands in United States 
v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) did not establish a clear test; 
and (b) the Master did not indicate whether Dauphin Island 
should be treated as an extension of the mainland, if Mobile Bay 
was not considered land. 
If Dauphin Island is considered an extension of the 
mainland, the SG's argument that this creates only a small 
juridical bay (from the western end of the island to Point 
Chenes) may be well taken. Article 7 does not encompass bays 
formed by islands which cannot realistically be considered part 
of the mainland. However, an island may be included in a bay if 
it lies in or near the mouth of the bay and gives the bay more 
than one natural entrance. The fringe islands may reasonably be 
treated as either creating a juridical bay or giving an existing 
bay multiple mouths. 
The Master's finding that Mississippi Sound is a historic 








contested the state's ownership of the Sound until the second 
half of the twentieth century and (b) historic bays, by 
definition, are unique. Nonetheless, although the factual 
finding may not influence many cases, the criteria adopted by 
the Court will be used by other parties and may be cited against 
-~ -- ·--·----------
the United States in international cases. 
~~~----~ 
The SG's exceptions to the finding that the Sound is an 
historic bay may not be persuasive. He admits that there is 
evidence to support that conclusion (see page 23 of the United 
States' exceptions) but suggests that the states4 exercise of 
jurisdiction was not sufficiently effective, persistent or 
notorious. This may be an impossible test. How can a state 
exercise inland jurisdiction in an effective, persistent and 
notorious manner if from 1819 on no foreign country had any 
reason to question that the Sound was within the United States 
and the United States acceded to the states' exercise of 
jurisdiction until 1971? 
The strongest of the states' exceptions are variations of 
the historic bay argument. -Mississippi suggests that the Court 
should not defer to the United States' disclaimer of straight 
baseline because the United States historically employed 
straight baselines. Similarly, Alabama's argument that its Act 
of Admission, "as historically interpreted," extends states 
jurisdiction over the Sound, is an attempt to balance history 
against the United States' effort to change its position. 
Of the remaining issues raised, one may merit mention. 
Alaska argues that both the language of, and the intent behind, 
the Submerged Lands Act grants Alabama and Mississippi all the 
submerged lands landward of their most seaward contiguous 
boundaries. Alaska's argument is well made, does not appear to 
be precluded by the Court's prior opinions (see United States v. 
Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (196) limiting "each coastal state's 
seaward boundary at three geographical miles"), and is not 
really addressed by the Master or the United States. If this 
argument bears scrutiny, the Court may wish to invite further 
briefs. 
CONCLUSION: Because the exceptions raise important 
unsettled issues that have national and international 
ramifications, the exceptions should be scheduled for oral 
argument. Argument should be held in tandem with argument in 
No. 35 Original, United States v. Haine, because both cases .....__ 
~ise ~he issue of whether an island may be considered an 
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fu establish certain waters as "b~storic (!)~ " it is ~ ~!.:... . 
necessary to show that the coastal state has traditionally~~ 
asserted and maintained dominion over the waters in question with 
~..________ --
fue acquiescence of foreign states. United States v. California, 
381 u.s. 139, 172 (1965). The Special Master cited persuasive 
evidence 
historic 
for his conclusion that Mississippi Sound represents :) 
( 
{\, ]/I • II j ) • I ~ . .,, 7 
inland waters. T4-- Y~ ~ ~ ~~~ , 
Perhaps most telling is the fact that every nation that 
exercised sovereignty over the surrounding mainland and islands 
~s considered the Sound to be part of its possession. For 
example, after the Louisiana Purchase, Congress authorized the 
~esident to take possession of "all navigable waters, rivers, 
creeks, bays, and inlets lying within the United States, which 
empty into the Gulf of Mexico east of the River Mississippi." 
Spain disputed the United States' authority over the eastern part ___..... 
of these waters, but acquiesced by Treaty in 1819. 
In the 1800s, a number of Congressional documents indicate 
that Congress thought that the Sound represented inland waters of ---------.,. c.---
the United States. The Special Master cited three Senate reports 
discussing the necessity and possibility of defending these 
waters. By 1847 Ship Island was reserved for military use. In 
1857 Congress authorized the construction of a fort and 
·' 
construction began the next year. In 1861, Union troops 
destroyed the fort to prevent it from failing into Confederate 
hands. The fort changed hands several times during the War and 
sometime afterwards was abandoned. It nevertheless is strong 
~idence, I think, of the United States' claim that the waters 
north of Ship Island were its own. 
The acts admitting Mississippi and Alabama to the Union define 
their boundaries as extending to the Gulf of Mexico, and then, 
respectively, westerly and easterly, "including all islands 
within six miles of the shore." Mississippi and Alabama argue 
~at this lauguage establishes the southern coast of the barrier 
~lands as their southern boundaries. Additionally, in Louisiana 
~ Mississippi, 202 u.s. 1, (1905), this Court spoke of 
Mississippi Sound as "an enclosed arm of the sea, wholly within 
the United States •••• " The brief of Alabama also cites 
numerous examples from the past fifty years of the United States' 
claim that Mississippi Sound is inland waters. (See pp. 15 - 20.) 
I think that the foregoing show that the run ited States\ has 
traditionally asserted and maintained dominion over the waters of 
Miss1Ss1ppi Sound sufficient to establish the first element of 
the States' claim that the water is an f istoric ~Yj---
It is a bit more difficult to cite direct evidence that 
foreign states acquiesced in this claim. The 1819 Treaty with 
spain is the only example cited to the Court. As Alabama points 
out, however, the reason it hasn't had to exclude foreign fishing 
trawlers, for example, is because the Sound is too shallow for 
all but the "shallowest draft coastal vessels and barges." In 
.v 
United States v. Alaska, 422 u.s. 184, 200 (1975}, the Court 
noted a U.N. study which concluded that a State need not 
necessarily have undertaken "concrete action to enforce its 
relevant laws and regulations" in the area claimed as an historic 
bay, if its laws and regulations were respected. Rather, it is 
essential that a State act to the extent necessary to maintain 
its authority over the area. There is no claim here that the 
coastal nation has failed to enforce its authority in the face of 
disrespect by foreign nations. Thus, I think the Special Master 
correctly concluded that both of the components of the historic 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No.9 Orig. 
UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA ET AL. (ALABAMA 
AND MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY CASE) 
ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER 
[February - , 1985] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is the latest chapter in the long-lasting litigation be-
tween the Federal Government and the States of the Gulf 
Coast concerning ownership of the seabed, minerals, and 
other natural resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico. The 
particular and narrow issue presented here is whether the 
waters of Mississippi Sound are inland waters. If the Sound 
constitutes inland waters, as the States of Alabama and Mis-
sissippi contend, then these States own the lands submerged 
under the Sound. If the Sound in substantial part does not 
constitute inland waters, as the Government contends, then 
the United States owns the lands submerged under several 
"enclaves" of high seas within the Sound. We conclude that 
Mississippi Sound qualifies as a historic bay, and that the 
waters of the Sound, therefore, are inland waters. ' 
I 
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. 
§ 1301 et seq., confirms to each State title to and ownership of 
the lands beneath navigable waters within the State's bound-
aries. § 1311(a). The Act also confirms in each coastal 
State a seaward boundary three geographical miles distant 
from its coastline. § 1312. A State bordering on the Gulf 
of Mexico, however, may be entitled to a historic seaward 
boundary beyond three geographical miles and up to three 
marine leagues (approximately nine geographical miles) dis-
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tant from its coastline. §§ 1301(b), 1312. The Act defines 
the term "coast line" as "the line of ordinary low water along 
that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the 
open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland 
waters." § 1301(c). The first part of this definition is rela-
tively easy to apply. The second part-requiring determina-
tion of "the line marking the seaward limit of inland wa-
ters" -is more difficult to apply because the term "inland 
waters" is not defined in the Act. 
In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960), this 
Court determined, among other things, that the States of 
Alabama and Mississippi are not entitled under the Sub-
merged Lands Act to a historic seaward boundary three ma-
rine leagues distant from their coastlines. Rather, the 
Court held, these two States are entitled, as against the 
United States, to all the lands, minerals, and other natural 
resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico, extending seaward 
from their coastlines for a distance of no more than three 
geographical miles. ld., at 79-82, 83 (opinion); United 
States v. Louisiana, 364 U. S. 502, 503 (1960) (decree). The 
Court, however, did not express any opinion as to the precise 
location of the coastline from which the three-mile belt is to 
be measured. 363 U. S., at 82, nn. 135 and 139. The Court 
merely noted, in accordance with the above-mentioned defi-
nition in §2(c) of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. 
§ 1301(c), that "the term 'coast line' means the line of ordi-
nary low water along that portion of the coast which is in di-
rect contact with the open sea and the line marking the sea-
ward limit of inland waters." 364 U. S., at 503. See also 
363 U. S., at 83. The Court retained jurisdiction to enter-
tain further proceedings, including proceedings to resolve 
any dispute in locating the relevant coastline. Ibid.; 364 
U. S., at 504. 
As has been noted, locating the coastline requires the de-
termination of the seaward limit of "inland waters." Follow-
No.9 Orig.-OPINION 
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ing the Court's decision in United States v. Louisiana, a dis-
agreement arose between the United States and the States of 
Alabama and Mississippi concerning the status of Mississippi 
Sound as inland waters. The Sound is a body of water imme-
diately south of the mainland of the two States. It extends 
from Lake Borgne at the west to Mobile Bay at the east, and 
is bounded on the south by a line of barrier islands. These 
islands, from west to east, are Isle au Pitre, Cat Island, Ship 
Island, Horn Island, Petit Bois Island, and Dauphin Island. 
The Sound is approximately 80 miles long and 10 miles wide. 
The two States contend that the whole of Mississippi 
Sound constitutes "inland waters." Under this view, the 
coastline of the States consists of the lines of ordinary low 
water along the southern coasts of the barrier islands to-
gether with appropriate lines connecting the barrier islands. 
These latter lines mark the seaward limit of Mississippi 
Sound. The United States, on the other hand, denies the in-
land water status of Mississippi Sound. Under its view, the 
coastline of the States generally consists of the lines of ordi-
nary low water along the southern mainland and around each 
of the barrier islands. 1 
1 The United States' position actually is somewhat more complicated. 
First, the United States concedes that Isle au Pitre may be treated as part 
of the mainland, and that a bay closing line may be drawn from the eastern 
tip of Isle au Pitre to the eastern promontory of St. Louis Bay on the main-
land. Thus, the waters of Mississippi Sound west of this bay-closing line 
are inland waters, and the bay-closing line forms part of the legal coastline 
of Mississippi. Second, the United States takes the position that if Dau-
phin Island at Mobile Bay is properly treated as part of the mainland-
which the United States disputes-then a bay closing line may be drawn 
from the western tip of Dauphin Island northwesterly to Point Aux Chenes 
on the mainland, just west of the Alabama-Mississippi boundary. Under 
this secondary or fall-back position of the United States, the waters of Mis-
sissippi Sound east of this bay-closing line are inland waters, and the bay-
closing line forms part of the legal coastline of Alabama and Mississippi. 
Finally, there are several undisputed inland rivers and bays along the 
shores of Alabama and Mississippi, and, as a consequence, undisputed clos-
No. 9 Orig.-OPINION 
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Under the States' view, then, the States own all the lands 
underlying Mississippi Sound, as well as the lands underlying 
the Gulf of Mexico extending seaward for a distance of three 
geographical miles from the southern coasts of the barrier 
islands and the lines connecting those islands. Under the 
United States' view, on the other hand, the States own only 
those lands underlying Mississippi Sound and the Gulf of 
Mexico that are within three geographical miles of the main-
land ·coast or of the coasts of the barrier islands. There are 
several areas within Mississippi Sound that are more than 
three miles from any point on these coasts. Under the 
United States' view, those areas constitute "enclaves" or 
pockets of high seas, and the lands underlying them belong to 
the United States. 
To resolve this dispute over the inland-water status of Mis-
sissippi Sound, the two States and the United States filed 
motions and cross-motions for the entry of a supplemental 
decree. The Court referred these pleadings to its Special 
Master, the Honorable Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., who al-
ready had been appointed in United States v. Louisiana 
(Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U. S. 11 (1969). See 444 
U. S. 1064 (1980); 445 U. S. 923 (1980). See also 457 U. S. 
1115 (1982). Following extended proceedings, the Special 
Master has submitted his Report to this Court. 
II 
As noted above, the Submerged Lands Act employs but 
does not define the term "inland waters." In United States 
v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 161-167 (1965), this Court ob-
served that Congress had left to the Court the task of defin-
ing "inland waters" for purposes of the Submerged Lands 
Act. The Court for those purposes has adopted the defini-
tions provided in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2) 1607, 
ing lines across the mouths of these rivers and bays that, in the Govern-
ment's view, form part of the legal coastline of the States. 
No.9 Orig.-OPINION 
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T. I. A. S. No. 5639 (the Convention). 381 U. S., at 165. 
See also Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 35; United 
States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary 
Case), ante, at-- (slip op. 8-9). 
The Convention, however, uses terminology differing 
somewhat from the terminology of the Submerged Lands 
Act. In particular, the Convention uses the term "baseline" 
to refer to the "coast line," and it uses the term "territorial 
sea" to refer to the three-geographical-mile belt extending 
seaward from the coastline. The territorial sea is one of the 
three zones into which, in international law, the sea is di-
vided. The Court so explained in the Louisiana Boundary 
Case: 
"Under generally accepted principles of international 
law, the navigable sea is divided into three zones, distin-
guished by the nature of the control which the contigu-
ous nation can exercise over them. Nearest to the na-
tion's shores are its inland, or internal waters. These 
are subject to the complete sovereignty of the nation, as 
much as if they were a part of its land territory, and the 
coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude foreign 
vessels altogether. Beyond the inland waters, and 
measured from their seaward edge, is a belt known as 
the marginal, or territorial, sea. Within it the coastal 
nation may exercise extensive control but cannot deny 
the right of innocent passage to foreign nations. Out-
side the territorial sea are the high seas, which are inter-
national waters not subject to the dominion of any single 
nation." 394 U. S., at 22-23 (footnotes omitted). 
Article 3 of the Convention provides the general rule for 
determining the "baseline": 
"Except where otherwise provided in these articles, 
the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the 
territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as 
No.9 Orig.-OPINION 
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marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the 
coastal State." 
The Convention, however, provides several exceptions to the 
general rule pursuant to which Mississippi Sound might qual-
ify as inland waters. 
First, Article 4 of the Convention permits a nation to em-
ploy the method of straight baselines in delimiting its coast-
line. Article 4(1) provides in pertinent part: 
"In localities where the coast line is deeply indented 
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the 
coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in 
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the terri-
torial sea is measured." 
If the method of straight baselines were applied to the coast 
of Alabama and Mississippi, the coastline would be drawn by 
connecting the barrier islands, thus enclosing Mississippi 
Sound as inland waters. The Court has held, however, that 
the method of straight baselines is applicable only if the 
Federal Government has chosen to adopt it. See Louisiana 
Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 72-73; United States v. Cali-
fornia, 381 U. S., at 167-169. In the present case, the Spe-
cial Master concluded that the United States has not adopted 
the straight baseline method. 
Second, Article 7 of the Convention provides a set of rules 
for determining whether a body of water qualifies as inland 
waters because it is a "juridical bay." Under Article 7(2), 
such a bay is defined to be "a well-marked indentation whose 
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as 
to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere 
curvature of the coast." In addition, the area of the indenta-
tion must be "as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-
circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that 
indentation." And the closing line of the bay must not ex-
ceed 24 miles. The Special Master concluded that Missis-
No.9 Orig.-OPINION 
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sippi Sound satisfies these criteria and thus qualifies as a 
juridical bay. In reaching this conclusion, the Master deter-
mined that Dauphin Island was to be treated as part of the 
mainland. The closing line drawn from the easternmost 
point of Isle au Pitre to the westernmost point of Dauphin 
Island, connecting each of the intervening barrier islands, 
crosses water gaps totaling less than 24 miles in length. 
Finally, Article 7(6) of the Convention indicates that a 
body of water can qualify as inland waters if it is a "historic 
bay." The Convention does not define the term "historic 
bay." The Special Master concluded that Mississippi Sound 
qualifies as a historic bay under the tests noted in United 
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 172, and United States v. 
Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 189 (1975). 
The Special Master, accordingly, recommended to this 
Court that a decree be entered in favor of Alabama and 
Mississippi. 
The United States and the States of Alabama and Missis-
sippi respectively filed exceptions to the Master's Report. 
The United States argued that the Master erred in conclud-
ing that Mississippi Sound is both a juridical bay and a 
historic bay; it claims that it is neither. Alabama and Missis-
sippi agreed with those conclusions of the Special Master, but 
argued that there also were alternative grounds for conclud-
ing that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland waters. In 
particular, the States argued that their Acts of Admission 
established their boundaries along the southern coast of the 
barrier islands; that Mississippi Sound qualifies as inland 
waters under the straight baseline method of Article 4 of the 
Convention and prior United States practice; that Mississippi 
Sound qualifies as a juridical bay regardless of the charac-
terization of Dauphin Island as a "mainland headland;" and 
that even if the whole of Mississippi Sound is not a juridical 
bay, a smaller juridical bay exists at the eastern end of the 
Sound. 
No.9 Orig.-OPINION 
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We have independently reviewed the record, as we must. 
See Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U. S. 289, 291-292, 294 
(1974); Colorado v. New Mexico,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) 
(slip op. 6); Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case, 
ante, at--, (slip op. 1). Upon that review, we conclude 
that the Special Master correctly determined that Mississippi 
Sound is a historic bay. We therefore need not, and do not, 
address the exceptions presented by the States of Alabama 
and Mississippi or those exceptions of the United States that 
relate to the question whether Mississippi Sound qualifies as 
a juridical bay under Article 7 of the Convention. 
III 
The term "historic bay" 2 is not defined in the Convention 
and there is no complete accord as to its meaning. The 
Court has stated that a historic bay is a bay "over which a 
coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained do-
minion with the acquiescence of foreign nations." United 
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 172. See also United 
States v. Alaska, 422 U. S., at 189; Louisiana Boundary 
Case, 394 U. S., at 23. The Court also has noted that there 
appears to be general agreement that at least three factors 
are to be taken into consideration in determining whether a 
body of water is a historic bay: (1) the exercise of authority 
over the area by the claiming nation; (2) the continuity of this 
exercise of authority; and (3) the acquiescence of foreign 
nations. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U. S., at 189; 
Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 23-24, n. 27. An 
authoritative United Nations study concludes that these 
2 In this opinion, the tenn "historic bay'' is used interchangeably with 
the tenn "historic inland waters." It is clear that a historic bay need not 
confonn to the geographic tests for a juridical bay set forth in Article 7 of 
the Convention. See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S. 11, 75, n. 100 
(1969). In this case, as in that one, we need not decide how unlike a juridi-
cal bay a body of water can be and still qualify as a historic bay, for it 
is clear from the Special Master's Report that, at minimum, Mississippi 
Sound closely resembles a juridical bay. 
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three factors require that "the coastal State must have effec-
tively exercised sovereignty over the area continuously dur-
ing a time sufficient to create a usage and have done so under 
the general toleration of the community of States." Juridical 
Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays 56, 
U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962) (hereinafter Juridical Re-
gime). 3 In addition, there is substantial agreement that a 
fourth factor to be taken into consideration is the vital inter-
ests of the coastal nation, including elements such as geo-
graphical configuration, economic interests, and the require-
ments of self-defense. See Juridical Regime, at 38, 56-58; 1 
A. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries 48-49 (1962). See 
also Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I. C. J. 116, 142. 
In the present case, the facts establish that the United States 
effectively has exercised sovereignty over Mississippi Sound 
as inland waters from the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 
1803 until 1971, and has done so without protest by foreign 
nations. 
A 
Mississippi Sound historically has been an intracoastal wa-
terway of commercial and strategic importance to the United 
States. Conversely, it has been of little significance to for-
eign nations. The Sound is shallow, ranging in depth gener-
ally from 1 to 18 feet except for artificially maintained chan-
nels between Cat Island and Ship Island leading to Gulfport, 
Miss., and between Horn Island and Petit Bois Island leading 
to Pascagoula, Miss. Outside those channels, it is not 
readily navigable for ocean-going vessels. Furthermore, it 
is a cul de sac, and there is no reason for an ocean-going ves-
sel to enter the Sound except to reach the Gulf ports. The 
historic importance of Mississippi Sound to vital interests of 
3 The study explains that "no precise length of time can be indicated as 
necessary to build the usage on which the historic title must be based. It 
must remain a matter of judgement when sufficient time has elapsed for 
the usage to emerge." Juridical Regime, at 45. See also 1 A. Shalowitz, 
Shore and Sea Boundaries 49 (1962) (hereinafter Shalowitz). 
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the United States, and the corresponding insignificance of 
the Sound to the interests of foreign nations, lend support to 
the view that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland waters. 4 
Throughout most of the 19th century, the United States 
openly recognized Mississippi Sound as an inland waterway 
of importance for commerce, communications, !lnd defense. 
Early in this period the Nation took steps to enhance and pro-
tect its interests in the Sound. On February 8, 1817, the 
House of Representatives listed among objects of national 
importance several "improvements requisite to afford the ad-
vantages of internal navigation and intercourse throughout 
the United States and its Territories," including "as a more 
distant object, a canal communication, if practicable, from the 
Altamaha and its waters to Mobile, and from thence to the 
Mississippi." H. R. Doc. No. 427, 14th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1817), reprinted in 2 American State Papers 420, 422 (1834). 
This project ultimately became the Intracoastal Waterway 
thr~ugh Mississippi Sound. On February 28, 1822, the 
House Committee on Military Affairs issued a report that 
recognized the importance of the intracoastal communication 
between New Orleans and Mobile Bay through what an 1820 
letter reprinted in the report described as "the little interior 
sea, comprised between the main and the chain of islands, 
bounded by Cat Island to the west, and Dauphin Island to the 
east." H. R. Rep. No. 51, 17th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1823). 
Defense of this important waterway has been a longstand-
ing concern of the United States. On April 20, 1836, the 
'United States Attorney General Edmund Randolph long ago employed 
similar reasoning in his opinion that Delaware Bay constitutes inland 
waters: 
"These remarks may be enforced by asking, What nation can be injured 
in its rights by the Delaware being appropriated to the United States? 
And to what degree may not the United States be injured, on the contrary 
ground? It communicates with no foreign dominion; no foreign nation has 
ever before had a community of right in it, as if it were a main sea; under 
the former and present governments, the exclusive jurisdiction has been 
asserted. " 1 Op. A tty Gen. 32, 37 (1793). 
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Senate passed a resolution calling upon the Secretary of War 
to survey the most eligible sites for a fortification suitable for 
the defense of Mississippi Sound and the commerce along it. 
See S. Rep. No. 490, 26th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1840). A sub-
sequent resolution instructed the Senate Committee on Mili-
tary Affairs to study the expediency of erecting a fort on the 
western extremity of Ship Island. See S. Rep. No. 618, 26th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1840). In response to an inquiry pursu-
ant to this resolution, the War Department noted: "The de-
fenses indicated would cover one of the channels leading from 
the gulf into the broad interior water communication extend-
ing from Lake Borgne to the bay of Mobile." I d., at 2. 5 
Ship Island was reserved for military purposes by an exec-
utive order of August 30, 1847. In 1858, the War Depart-
ment, responsive to an appropriation made by Congress, see 
the Act of Mar. 3. 1857, 11 Stat. 191, 192, authorized the 
building of a fort on. the island. It was to be constructed at 
the island's west end, and to command the pass into Missis-
sippi Sound between Ship and Cat Islands. Forty-eight can-
nons were ordered to arm the fort. During the War Be-
tween the States, the fort was occupied alternately by Union 
and Confederate troops. It was finally abandoned in 1875. 
6 Ten years later, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs noted: 
"The broad sheet of water which lies between the coast of Mississippi 
and the chain of islands parallel to it, is the channel of a commerce impor-
tant in peace and indispensable in war. Through this passes the inland 
navigation which connects New Orleans and Mobile. This is the route of 
the mails and of a large part of the travel between the eastern and south-
western sections of the Union. Through this channel supplies for the 
naval station at Pensacola are most readily drawn from the great store-
house, the valley of the Mississippi, and its importance in this respect 
would be increased in a two-fold degree by the contingency of a maritime 
war: first, because a war would increase the requisite amount of supplies at 
that station; and, secondly, because it would greatly augment the difficul-
ties of the more extended and exposed lines of communication by exterior 
navigation." S. Rep. No. 23, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1850). 
,. 
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In 1879, the United States erected a lighthouse on the central 
section of the island. 6 
The United States argues that this official recognition of 
Mississippi Sound as an internal waterway of commercial and 
strategic importance has no relevance to the Sound's status 
as a historic bay. ~t would support this argument with a 
citation to the 1962 United Nations study of historic waters. 
Juridical Regime, at 56-58. The cited pages of the study dis-
cuss the view taken by some authors and governments that 
such circumstances as geographic configuration, require-
ments of self-defense, or other vital interests of the coastal 
state may justify a claim to historic bay status without the 
necessity of establishing long usage. The study notes, id., 
at 58, that "[t]here is undoubtedly some justification for this 
view," but ultimately suggests that it does not make sense 
for "historic title" to be claimed in circumstances where the 
historic element is wholly absent. Ibid. The study, how-
ever, does not suggest that such circumstances as geographic 
configuration and vital interests are irrelevant to the ques-
tion whether a body of water is a historic bay and, indeed, it 
affirmatively indicates that such circumstances can fortify a 
claim to "historic bay'' status that is based on usage. 7 
6 See, generally, Report of the Special Master 38; Caraway, The Story 
of Ship Island, 1699-1941, 4 J. Miss. Hist. 76 (1942); Weinert, The Ne-
glected Key to the Gulf Coast, 31 J. Miss. Hist. 269 (1969). 
The United States argues that the fortification of Ship Island is relevant 
only to the United States' suppression of its civil insurrection. But the 
fort was planned and construction was begun years before the outbreak of 
the Civil War, and it was not abandoned until some years after the conclu-
sion of that War. The United States further argues that the abandonment 
of the fort suggests a retreat from any claim of inland water status for Mis-
sissippi Sound. But it seems just as likely, and perhaps more likely, that 
the fort eventually was abandoned because foreign nations completely ac-
quiesced in the United States' assertion of sovereignty over the Sound, 
rendering the fort unnecessary. 
7 The study cites Bourquin as a proponent of the view that "[t]he char-
acter of a bay depends on a combination of geographical, political, eco-
nomic, historical and other circumstances." Juridical Regime, at 25 
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In any event, the evidence discussed above does not 
merely demonstrate that Mississippi Sound is presently im-
portant to vital interests of the United States. Rather, the 
evidence demonstrates that the United States historically 
and expressly has recognized Mississippi Sound as an impor-
tant internal waterway and has exercised sovereignty over 
the Sound on that basis throughout much of the 19th century. 
B 
The United States continued openly to assert the inland 
water status of Mississippi Sound throughout the 20th cen-
tury until1971. Prior to its ratification of the Convention on 
March 24, 1961,8 the United States had adopted a policy of 
enclosing as inland waters those areas between the mainland 
and offlying islands that were so closely grouped that no en-
trance exceeded 10 geographical miles. 9 This 10-mile rule 
represented the publicly stated policy of the United States at 
least since the time of the Alaska Boundary Arbitration in 
1903. There is no doubt that foreign nations were aware 
(translating and quoting Bourquin, Les Baies Historiques, in Melanges 
Georges Sauser-Hall 42 (1952)). Bourquin explains: 
''Where long usage is invoked by a State, it is a ground additional to the 
other grounds on which its claim is based. In justification of its claim, it 
will be able to point not only to the configuration of the bay, to the bay's 
economic importance to it, to its need to control the bay in order to protect 
its territory, etc., but also to the fact that its acts with respect to the bay 
have always been those of the sovereign and that its rights are thus con-
finned by historical tradition." Juridical Regime, at 25-26. 
8 The Convention did not go into effect, however, until September 10, 
1964, when the requisite number of nations had ratified it. 
9 The United States confinned this policy in a number of offi~ial commu-
nications during the period from 1951 to 1961. See Report of the Special 
Master 48-54. Also, the United States followed this policy in drawing the 
Chapman line along the Louisiana coast following the decision in United 
States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699 (1950). See Shalowitz, at 161. In a 
letter to Governor Wright of Mississippi, written on October 17, 1951, 
Oscar L. Chapman, then Secretary of the Interior, indicated that if the 
Chapman line were extended eastward beyond the Louisiana border, it 
would enclose Mississippi Sound as inland waters. 
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that the United States had adopted this policy. Indeed, the 
United States' policy was cited and discussed at length by 
both the United Kingdom and Norway in the celebrated 
Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), supra. 10 Nor is there any 
doubt, under the stipulations of the parties in this case, that 
Mississippi Sound constituted inland waters under that view. 
The United States contends that its earlier adoption of and 
adherence to a general formulation of coastline delimitation 
under which Mississippi Sound would have qualified as inland 
waters is not a sufficiently specific claim to the Sound as in-
land waters to establish it as a historic bay. In the present 
case, however, the general principles in fact were coupled 
with specific assertions of the status of the Sound as inland 
waters. The earliest such assertion in the 20th century oc-
curred in Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1 (1906). In 
that case, the Court determined the location of the boundary 
between Louisiana and Mississippi in the waters of Lake 
Borgne and Mississippi Sound. The Court described the 
Sound as "an inclosed arm of the sea, wholly within the 
United States, and formed by a chain of large islands, ex-
tending westward from Mobile, Alabama, to Cat Island. 
The openings from this body of water into the Gulf are nei-
ther of them six miles wide." I d., at 48. The Court ruled 
that the doctrine of "thalweg" was applicable to determine 
the exact location of the boundary separating Louisiana from 
Mississippi in Lake Borgne and Mississippi Sound. Under 
that doctrine, the water boundary between States is defined 
as the middle of the deepest or most navigable channel, as 
distinguished from the geographic center or a line midway 
between the banks. See Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U. S. 702, 
709-710 (1973); Louisiana v. Mississippi, -- U. S. --, 
10 It is noteworthy that in the Fisheries Case, the International Court of 
Justice ruled that the consistent and prolonged application of the Norwe-
gian system of delimiting inland waters, combined with the general tolera-
tion of foreign states, gave rise to a historic right to apply the system. 
See 1951 I. C. J., at 138-139. 
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-- (1984) (slip op. 3-5). The Court concluded that the 
"principle of thalweg is applicable," not only to navigable 
rivers, but also to "sounds, bays, straits, gulfs, estuaries and 
other arms of the sea." 202 U. S., at 50. The Court re-
jected the contention that the doctrine did not apply in Lake 
Borgne and Mississippi Sound because those bodies were 
"open sea." Id., at 51-52. The Court noted that the record 
showed that Lake Borgne and the relevant part of Missis-
sippi Sound is not open sea but "a very shallow arm of the 
sea, having outside of the deep water channel an inconsider-
able depth." I d., at 52. The Court clearly treated Missis-
sippi Sound as inland waters, under the category of "bays 
wholly within [the Nation's] territory not exceeding two ma-
rine leagues in width at the mouth." Ibid. 
The United States argues that the language in Louisiana 
v. Mississippi does not constitute a holding that Mississippi 
Sound is inland waters. It appears to us, however, that the 
Court's conclusion that the Sound was inland waters was es-
sential to its ruling that the doctrine of thalweg was appli-
cable. The United States also argues that it cannot be 
bound by the holding because it was not a party in that case. 
The significance of the holding for the present case, however, 
is not its effect as precedent in domestic law, but rather its 
effect on foreign nations that would be put on notice by the 
decision that the United States considered Mississippi Sound ? ~ 
to be inland waters. 
If foreign nations retained any doubt after Louisiana v. 
Mississippi that the official policy of the United States was 
to recognize Mississippi Sound as inland waters, that doubt 
must have been eliminated by the unequivocal declaration of 
the inland water status of Mississippi Sound by the United 
States in an earlier phase of this very litigation. 11 In a brief 
11 The United States also acknowledged that Mississippi Sound consti-
tutes inland waters in a letter written by the Secretary of the Interior to 
the Governor of Mississippi on October 17, 1951, confinning that the oil and 
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filed with this Court on May 15, 1958, the United States 
noted: 
"[W]e need not consider whether the language, 'includ-
ing the islands' etc., would of itself include the water 
area intervening between the islands and the mainland 
(though we believe it would not), because it happens that 
all the water so situated in Mississippi is in Mississippi 
Sound, which this Court has described as inland water. 
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 48. The bed of 
these inland waters passed to the State on its entry into 
the Union. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212." 
Brief for United States in Support of Motion for Judg-
ment on Amended Complaint in United States v. Louisi-
ana, 0. T. 1958, No. 10 Original, p. 254. 12 
Similarly, in discussing Alabama's entitlement to submerged 
lands, the United States conceded that "the water between 
the islands and the Alabama mainland is inland water; conse-
quently, we do not question that the land under it belongs to 
the State." I d., at 261. 
The United States argues that the States cannot now in-
voke estoppel based on the Federal Government's earlier 
construction of Louisiana v. Mississippi as describing Mis-
sissippi Sound as inland water. The United States points 
out that the Court in the Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 
U. S., at 73-74, n. 97, concluded that a similar concession 
with respect to Louisiana was not binding on the United 
States. As with the Court's holding in 1906 in Louisiana v. 
Mississippi, however, the significance of the United States' 
concession in 1958 is not that it has binding effect in domestic 
law, but that it represents a public acknowledgment of the 
gas leasing rights inside the barrier islands belonged to the State of Missis-
sippi. Report of the Special Master 42-44. 
12 In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960), Alabama and Mis-
sissippi argued that language in their Acts of Admission and in other his-
toric documents entitled them to ownership of all submerged lands located 
within three marine leagues of their coastlines. See id., at 79-82. 
No.9 Orig.-OPINION 
ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY CASE 17 
official view that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland waters 
of the nation. 
c 
In addition to showing continuous exercise of authority 
over Mississippi Sound as inland waters, the States must 
show that foreign nations acquiesced in, or tolerated, this 
exercise. It is uncontested that no foreign government has 
ever protested the United States' claim to Mississippi·Sound 
as inland waters. This is not surprising in light of the geog-
raphy of the coast, the shallowness of the waters, and the ab-
sence of international shipping lanes in the vicinity. Schol-
arly comment is divided over whether the mere absence of 
opposition suffices to establish title. See United States v. 
Alaska, 422 U. S., at 189, n. 8, 199-200; Louisiana Bound-
ary Case, 394 U. S., at 23-24, n. 27. In United States v. 
Alaska, this Court held that, under the circumstances of that 
case, mere failure to object was insufficient because it had 
not been shown that foreign governments knew or reason-
ably should have known of the authority being asserted. 
There is substantial agreement that when foreign govern-
ments do know or have reason to know of the effective and 
continual exercise of sovereignty over a maritime area, in-
action or toleration on the part of the foreign governments is 
sufficient to permit a historic title to arise. See Juridical Re-
gime, at 48-49. See also Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 
1951 I. C. J., at 138-139. Moreover, it is necessary to prove 
only open and public exercise of sovereignty, not actual 
knowledge by the foreign governments. See Juridical Re-
gime, at 54-55. In the present case, the United States pub-
licly and unequivocally stated that it considered Mississippi 
Sound to be inland waters. We conclude that under these 
circumstances the failure of foreign governments to protest is 
sufficient proof of the acquiescence or toleration necessary to 
historic title. 
. ' 
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IV 
The United States contends that, notwithstanding the sub-
stantial evidence discussed above of the Government's asser-
tion of sovereignty over Mississippi Sound as inland water, 
the States have failed to satisfy their burden of proof that 
Mississippi Sound is a historic bay. The United States relies 
on its recent disclaimer of the inland-water status of the 
Sound and on the absence of any evidence of actual exclusion 
from the Sound of foreign navigation in innocent passage. 
We find neither of these points persuasive. 
A 
In April1971, the United States for the first time publicly 
disclaimed the inland-water status of Mississippi Sound by 
publishing a set of maps delineating the three-mile territorial 
sea and certain inland waters of the United States. These 
maps, which include the entire Gulf Coast, have been distrib-
uted to foreign governments in response to requests made 
upon the Department of State for documents delimiting the 
boundaries of the United States. 
This Court repeatedly has made clear that the United 
States' disclaimer of historic inland water status will not 
invariably be given decisive weight. In United States v. 
California, 381 U. S., at 175, the Court gave decisive effect 
to a disclaimer of historic inland water status by the United 
States only because the case involved "questionable evidence 
of continuous and exclusive assertions of dominion over the 
disputed waters." The Court suggested, however, that such 
a disclaimer would not be decisive in a case in which the his-
toric evidence was "clear beyond doubt." Ibid. The Court 
also suggested that "a contraction of a State's recognized 
territory imposed by the Federal Government in the name of 
foreign policy would be highly questionable." I d., at 168. 
See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1890). The Court 
reiterated this latter theme in the Louisiana Boundary 
Case, where it stated: 
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"It is one thing to say that the United States should 
not be required to take the novel, affirmative step of 
adding to its territory by drawing straight baselines. It 
would be quite another to allow the United States to pre-
vent recognition of a historic title which may already 
have ripened because of past events but which is called 
into question for the first time in a domestic lawsuit. 
The latter, we believe, would approach an impermissible 
contraction of territory against which we cautioned in 
United States v. California." 394 U. S., at 77, n. 104 
(emphasis in original). 
The maps constituting the disclaimer in the present case 
were published more than two years after the decree in the 
Louisiana Boundary Case, and 11 years after the decision in 
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960). The Special 
Master concluded that "under the circumstances it is difficult 
to accept the disclaimer as entirely extrajudicial in its moti-
vation." Report of the Special Master 47. Rather, accord-
ing to the Master, the disclaimer "would appear to be more in 
the nature of an attempt by the United States to prevent rec-
ognition of any pre-existing historic title which might already 
have ripened because of past events but which was called into 
question for the first time in a domestic lawsuit." Ibid. 
We conclude that historic title to Mississippi Sound as in-
land waters had ripened prior to the United States' ratifica-
tion of the Convention in 1961 and prior to its disclaimer of 
the inland-waters status of the Sound in 1971. That dis-
claimer, issued while the Court retained jurisdiction to re-
solve disputes concerning the location of the coastline of the 
Gulf Coast States, is insufficient to divest the States of their 
entitlement to the submerged lands under Mississippi Sound. 
B 
Finally, the United States argues that proof of historic in-
land water status requires a showing that sovereignty was 
exerted to exclude from the area all foreign navigation in in-
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nocent passage. This argument is based on the principle 
that a coastal nation has the privilege to exclude innocent-
passage foreign navigation from its inland waters, but not 
from its territorial sea. See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 
U. S., at 22. According to the United States, such exclusion 
is therefore the only conduct that conclusively demonstrates 
that the nation exercises authority over the waters in ques-
tion as inland waters and not merely as territorial sea. 
This rigid view of the requirements for establishing his-
toric inland-water status is unrealistic and is supported nei-
ther by the Court's precedents 13 nor by writers on inter-
national law. 14 To the contrary, in advocating a flexible 
approach to appraisal of the factors necessary to a valid claim 
of historic inland-waters status, two leading commentators 
have stated: "A relatively relaxed interpretation of the evi-
dence of historic assertion and of the general acquiescence of 
other states seems more consonant with the frequently amor-
13 In United States v. Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 197 (1975), the Court noted 
that to establish historic title to a body of water as inland waters, "the ex-
ercise of authority must have been, historically, an assertion of power to 
exclude all foreign vessels and navigation." It is clear, however, that a 
nation can assert power to exclude foreign navigation in ways other than 
by actual resort to the use of that power in specific instances. 
14 One prominent writer has explained the "actes d'appropriation" neces-
sary to establish effective exercise of sovereignty as follows: 
"It is hard to specify categorically what kind of acts of appropriation con-
stitute sufficient evidence: the exclusion from these areas of foreign vessels 
or their subjection to rules imposed by the coastal State which exceed the 
normal scope of regulation made in the interests of navigation would obvi-
ously be acts affording convincing evidence of the State's intent. It would, 
however, be too strict to insist that only such acts constitute evidence. In 
the Grisbadarna dispute between Sweden and Norway, the judgement of 
23 October 1909 mentions that 'Sweden has performed various acts . . . 
owing to her conviction that these regions were Swedish, as, for instance, 
the placing of beacons, the measurement of the sea, and the installation of a 
light-boat, being acts which involved considerable expense and in doing 
which she not only thought that she was exercising her right but even more 
that she was performing her duty."' 3 Gidel, Droit International Public 
de laMer 633 (1934), translated and quoted in Juridical Regime, at 41. 
' ~ . 
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phous character of the facts available to support these claims 
than a rigidly imposed requirement of certainty of proof, 
which must inevitably demand more than the realities of 
international life could ever yield." M. McDougal & W. 
Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 372 (1962). Similarly 
the 1962 United Nations study of historic waters notes that 
the requirement of effective exercise of sovereignty over the 
area by the appropriate action on the part of the claiming 
state 
"does not, however, imply that the State necessarily 
must have undertaken concrete action to enforce its rele-
vant laws and regulations within or with respect to the 
area claimed. It is not impossible that these laws and 
regulations were respected without the State having to 
resort to particular acts of enforcement. It is, however, 
essential that, to the extent that action on the part of the 
State and its organs was necessary to maintain authority 
over the area, such action was undertaken." Juridical 
Regime, at 43. 
Thus, although a coastal nation has the privilege to exclude 
from its inland waters foreign vessels in innocent passage, 
the need to exercise that privilege may never arise. Indeed, 
in the present case, as the United States seems to concede, 
the record does not indicate that there ever was any occasion 
to exclude from Mississippi Sound foreign vessels in innocent 
passage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. This is not surprising since, 
as noted above, foreign nations have little interest in Mis-
sissippi Sound and have acquiesced willingly in the United 
States' express assertions of sovereignty over the Sound as 
inland waters. We conclude that the absence in the record 
of evidence of any occasion for the United States to have ex-
ercised its privilege to exclude foreign navigation in innocent 
passage from Mississippi Sound supports rather than dis-
proves the claim of historic title to the Sound as inland 
waters. 
No.9 Orig.-OPINION 
22 ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY CASE 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the evidence discussed in the Re-
port of the Special Master and in Part III above, considered 
in its entirety, is sufficient to establish that Mississippi Sound 
constitutes a historic bay. The exception of the United 
States to the Special Master's recommended ruling that the 
whole of Mississippi Sound constitutes historic inland waters 
is overruled. We repeat that we do not address the excep-
tions of Alabama, or those of Mississippi, or the exceptions of 
the United States that relate to the question whether Missis-
sippi Sound qualifies as a juridical bay. The recommenda-
tions of the Special Master and his Report, to the extent they 
are consistent with this opinion, are respectively adopted and 
confirmed. The parties are directed promptly to submit to 
the Special Master a proposed appropriate decree for this 
Court's consideration; if the parties are unable to agree upon 
the form of the decree, each shall submit its proposal to 
the Master for his consideration and recommendation. Each 
party shall bear its own costs; the actual expenses of the Spe-
cial Master shall be borne half by the United States and half 
by Alabama and Mississippi. · 
The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further 
proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as from 
time to time may be determined necessary or advisable to 
effectuate and supplement the forthcoming decree and the 
rights of the respective parties. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
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